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The Boss Called, and Nobody Checked

Business email compromise drew $3.05 billion in reported losses in 2025, and AI gives scammers new tools. Five controls a small firm can set this week.

By Shane Waters
AIFraudSmall BusinessSecurity

A message lands in the finance person’s inbox. It looks like it came from the owner. It asks for a wire before noon and says to keep it quiet for now.

That message has a name, business email compromise, and in 2025 the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center logged $3.05 billion in reported losses to it across 24,768 complaints. The same report counted 1,008,597 complaints of every kind and $20.877 billion in total losses. Divide the business email figure by its complaint count and you get about $123,000 per complaint. An average hides a wide range, and plenty of losses are smaller, but even a fraction of that is a serious hit for a ten-person office.

I want to walk through how this fraud works, because the core request is the same whether the target is a global engineering firm or a county office here in Indiana: a trusted person asks for money to move. The fix costs less than most people expect.

The pattern

Someone receives a message that seems to come from a person they trust: the owner, a vendor, a title company, an attorney. It asks for money to move or for bank details to change. It is urgent, and a little private.

Early in 2024 a finance worker at the engineering firm Arup in Hong Kong received a message asking for a confidential transaction. The worker suspected phishing. Then they joined a video call where the chief financial officer and several colleagues appeared on screen, and every one of them was fake. Hong Kong police said the worker went on to send about HK$200 million, roughly $25 million, in 15 transfers. The company found out after checking with headquarters. The worker’s first instinct was correct, and the video call overrode it. That call is one documented way a doubt gets talked down, not the only way.

A smaller case sits in the FBI’s own report. In April 2025 a city government office in Oregon was hit with a business email compromise reported at more than $6 million. The FBI had already placed a freeze on the receiving account in March, after a different case. When the Oregon wire arrived, the recipient bank, acting on that freeze, contacted the sending bank to confirm the wire instructions. They were found to be fraudulent, and the sending bank was able to issue a recall for the $6 million. Across 2025 the FBI’s Recovery Asset Team worked 3,900 referred incidents with $1.16 billion in attempted theft and froze $679 million of it, which it reports as a 58 percent success rate. Frozen money still has to go through further steps before a victim is repaid, so treat that number as a reason to act fast, not a promise.

What AI changed

The same report logged 22,364 complaints that involved AI, with more than $893 million in losses. Businesses reported losses of over $30 million to business email compromise involving AI. The FBI says chat generators can quickly write official-sounding emails that mimic a company’s CEO, and that voice cloning can be used to request a wire payment. It also notes that not every tactic is AI-enabled.

A chat generator can write an official-sounding email in a CEO’s voice, so clean prose is not proof of a real sender. A small firm needs rules that still work when the message looks perfect.

For scale beyond the FBI’s count, the FTC counts differently: it says Americans reported losing $3.5 billion to imposter scams of every kind in 2025, nearly $1 billion of it to people pretending to be a business. That is a separate system from the FBI’s figures above, and it is not an AI total.

Five controls a small firm can set this week

None of these work unless your team feels free to use them. Say it out loud: if I ever ask for money in a hurry, check first, and I will thank you for it. Then set these.

  1. Call back on a number you already have. Any new payee or changed bank detail gets verified by phone, using a number from your own records and never the number in the message.
  2. Two people for money. Nobody sends a wire or transfer over a set amount alone, related payments count together toward that amount, and the second person is not the one who asked for it.
  3. A call is not proof. Voice and video can both be faked. Treat them as a reason to verify.
  4. Know your bank’s recall steps before you need them. Learn who you call, what form they want and what they will do. The FBI says that if you find a fraudulent transfer, time is of the essence: call your bank right away and ask for a recall. Then file a complaint at ic3.gov, which the FBI wants regardless of the amount.
  5. Lock the mailbox. A criminal who controls the owner’s or the finance person’s email can send a request from the real address. Those two accounts need phishing-resistant sign-in, a passkey or a security key, rather than a text code.

Run the review on yourself

Pick the last three times a vendor’s bank details changed or a rushed payment went out. For each one, ask who approved it and how they knew the request was real. Check whether the phone number used to verify came from the request itself. List who can approve a payment alone, and whether that person’s email has a second lock.

Write the results on one page, ranked, with a fix next to each item. Several of the fixes will be a single sentence in a written procedure that nobody had written down yet.

If you want a second set of eyes on that list, let’s talk.

Sources: FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 Internet Crime Report (ic3.gov); FTC press release on imposter scam losses, June 2026 (ftc.gov); Hong Kong police statements and Arup’s statement to CNN, 2024.

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